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Im vorliegenden Bericht wird eine typische Fabrikationsanlage zur Verar-
beitung von hochangereichertem Uran (HEU) hinsichtlich der Spaltstofffluß-
kontrolle im Rahmen der Verpflichtungen des Kernwaffensperrvertrages (NPT)
untersucht.
Im Vordergrund der Untersuchung stehen die notwendigen BilanzierungsmaR-
nahmen mit der Einrichtung von geeigneten Materialbilanzzonen (MBA) und
SchlüsselmePpunkten (fGMP). Insbesondere wird das Problem der realen Be-
standsaufnahme von spaltbarem Material behandelt und Abschätzungen der
gegenwärtig erreichbaren Meßgenauigkeiten statistischer und systematischer
Art an den entsprechenden K}W's gegeben. Mit Hilfe einer Referenzkampagne
wird die Gesamtunsicherheit einer Spaltmaterialbilanz berechnet, die bei
ca. 0,5 %relative Standardabweichung (RSA) des verarbeiteten Materials
liegt .
Abstract
In the present paper a typical fabrication plant for high enriched Uranium
(HEU) is investigated concerning safeguards of nuclear material under con-
ditions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with respect to accountability
of nuclear material.
For this purpose a hypothetical material balance area (MBA) plan with some
corresponding KMP's is assumed. Particular attention is paid on the estimation
of attainable measurement accuracies at the KMP' s and the problem of physicaJ.
inventory taking. With the help of a reference campaign the total uncertainty
of the material balance including flow and inventory measurements is investi-
gated resulting in a standard deviation of 0.5 %relative to the processed
material.
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Introduction
In the peaceful nuclear sector high enriched uranlUffi (HEU) with 90-93 %
U-235 enrichment is rnostly used for different types of MTR and High Flux
Reactor (RHF) fuel elements and their components. Another large scale
application may lie in the area of gas cooled U-Th reactors (TH'I'R).
A further use of such materials lies naturally in different research
activities.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, all the industrial activities in this
field are carried out in the fabri cation pLant NUKEM, Hanau , Aplant of thi s
type is expected to have a yearly throughput of around 400-700 kgs U with
90-93 %U-235 concentration. The total plant inventory at any time may lie
somewhere between 300-500 kgs U although the process bound inventory may be
only around 50-70 kgs of U.
Because of the high value and high purity of the material, coupled with the
fa.ct that a major part of the process steps involve Uranium metal, the measure-
ment accuracies for different safeguards relevant streams are expected to be
fairly high (excepting of course the discard streams).
1)Paper presented at the IAFA Working Group Meeting on 'Accuracy of Nuclear
Material Accountancy and Technical Effectiveness of Safeguards',
Vienna, 28.8.-1.9.1972
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In the present paper a NUKEM type HEU fabrication plant has been investigated
with particular attention to attainablemeasurement accuracies at some key
measurement points (KMP) and to the problem of inventory taking. For this
purpose a hypothetical material balance area (MBA) plan has been assumed
with some corresponding KMP's. The attainable measurement errors (both syste-
matic and random) have been estimated on the basis of actual measurement data
(whenever available). The problems associated with the inventory taking and
the error propagation with the expected measurement accuracies have been ~n­
vestigated for a reference campaign. It is to be noted that the data and
results discussed in this paper are preliminary in nature and do not in any
way prejudice the layout for or methods used in a future plant of this type.
2. Material Balance Areas and Key Measurement Points
A possible arrangement of MBA's with safeguards relevant K~~'s both for
throughput and inventory taking for a HEU fabrication plant is shown ~n
Fig. 1. The NUKEM type plant under consideration is expected to be a multiple
production facility. With high enriched uranium (90-93 %) in the form of UF6
as feed it is expected to produce uranium oxide, U-metal platelets, cermet
and alloy pictures, finished MTR and RHF elements. A single MBA is suggested
for this tpye of facility with 3 KMP's (1,2,3) for feed, product and waste
streams and 2 (11' 11
1)
for inventory measurements.
2.1 Material Balance Area
A NUKEM type plant may be taken to consist of a storage and a process area.
At a first glance it might appear to be worthwhile to divide the plant into
two MBA's namely one storage and one process. However, because of expected
operation practices a fairly heavy volume of back and forth flow is expected
to exist between the storage and the process areas. This is mainly because
of the fact that intermediate products from a number of process steps are
stored temporarily in the storage area before they are sent to the next process
step. The storage time for such items may vary between some hours and days.
Aseparate MBA for the storage area would involve enormous volume of reporting
of temporary material movements which would not be pertinent to safeguards.
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For safeguards purposes, the shippers bateh data at the input of the
storage area ean be used as input to the proeess, sinee the same data are
used by the operator for this purpose. Only some of the shippers data
(weight, isotopie U-235 eoneentration ete.) are eheeked roughly by the
operator for internal verifieation purposes.
For these reasons only one MBA appears suffieient for the NUKEM type plant
under eonsideration.
2.2 Key Measurement Points
At the KMP-1 (Fig. 1) the bateh data for UF6 eonsisting of eylinder number,
amount, U-faetor and the U-235 enriehment are expeeted to be taken over from
the shipper, i.e. at present the USAEC. The KMP-2 symbolieally represent the
measurement points for different types of produets. It should be noted that:
a) Apart of the souree data for the KMP-2 may be generated somewhere else
(eentral laboratory, y-speetroseopy stand ete.).
b) For the MTR type fuel elements (stream no. 2.4) the plant operator generates
the bateh data at the proeess step where pietures are made (see Fig. 7),
whereas, it has been assumed in this paper that the relevant bateh
data for this stream are generated at the final step i.e. after the
assembly has been eompleted. This is done on an experimental basis by
the EURATOM safeguards organization in the present NUKEM plant /2/ it may
be ehanged or remain as it is at a later date.
e) For the RHF fuel elements, no measurement method exists today for the
assay of uranium. Therefore, the last point of the proeess at whieh
uranium is measured for this stream is at the pieture stage. Henee this 1S
the stage at whieh souree data are generated for the purposes of safe-
guards. A number of proeess steps (plating, rolling, assembling, welding,
quality eontrol ete.) follow this stage.
d) The KMP's II and III are meant for inventory taking. It is to be noted
in this eonneetion that a partieular feature of this type of faeility is
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that all the nuclear material present 1n the storage or process areas,
can be brought into itemised forms during a physical inventory.
As a result the main activities at these KMP's consist of tag-
inventory, the amount stated in the tag having been measured at some
other time. A small part of inspection activities will consist of random
sampling and analysis of U content in measuring units to verify the tag
value.
3. Measurement Accuracies at KMP's
A reference campa1gn has been constructed to assess the influence of the
measurement errors on the material balance as weIl as to investigate
the problem of inventory taking. The throughput and the inventory data
are summarized in table 1. A 6 months throughput has been assumed with
195 kgs of 90/93 %enriched uranium as feed. Six categories of products
are assumed to be produced. The measured discards of 0.9 kgs of high
enriched uranium correspond to approximately 0.5 %of feed. The beginning
and the end inventories each of 495 kgs of high enriched uranium appear
to be high compared to the throughput. This lS mainly dictated by operation
and commercial conditions. The large number of products require relatively
large amounts of material as intermediate buffer volumes. Also the procure-
ment of the material for the whole campaign causes the inventory to go up.
The expected measurement accuraC1es at the KMP's 1,2 and 3 for the feed,
product and waste streams, i.e. the throughput of the plant, are presented
in table 2 along with some other relevant data for material balance.
A number of points are worth noting:
a) Very high overall accuracies are attainable for the KMP-l under
the present day industrial operating conditions (weighing < 0.01 %;
U-factor 0.05 %; mass spectrometry 0.05 %, all values in the table 2
on measurement errors are for 10 value unless otherwise specified).
As has been mentioned earlier this may be because of the fact that
UF6 is available in gas form for measurement and that it is obtained
in a highly pure form because of low acceptable impurity limits.
b) The systematic and random errors of measurement for the U-oxide
product are in the same range (0.2 %). Although in such cases
the influence of the random error 01' error propagation reduces
considerably for large numberof batches, in this particular case,
the influence may not be negligible (2 batches/6 months).
c) All the pictures (cermet and ceramic) and the MTR elements are measured
by y-spectroscopy (absorption and passive y) for their total uranium
content. The random errors lie in the same range of 0.4 %. The systema-
tic errors consisting of the calibration errors and the errors for
standards have been found to be ~ 0.3 %for the two types of pictures
(stream nos. 2.3, 2.6). The systematic error for y-spectroscopy for
the HTR elements have not been estimated. For the error propagation
calculations it has been taken to be ~ 0.3 %, l.e. same as in the
case of the pictures.
d) The random and systematic errors for THTR particles (stream no.2.5)
of 0.1 %each, appeal' to be extremely good. Son:e check of these values,
particularly the systema.tic part on an interlab scale might be worth-
while.
e ) The discards, also assayed y- spectroscopically, are neasured v i th r andom
and systematic error components of 15 %each. The fairly high percen-
tage of systematic error is caused by the presence of Thori urn , It might
be possible to reduce this particular value.
f) The precision for U-235 enrichment for the feed stream (KMP-1) has
been taken to be 0.05 %from Ref. /1/ and also used for error
propagation calculations. The input values and also the enrichment
in THTR coated particles are expected to be checked in a mass spectro-
meter at the plant. Typical results of calibration of such a mass spec-
trometer with NBS standards for 90 %and 93 %U-235 enrichment, are
shown in Table 3. It is to be noted that the results show a reproduci-
bility of 0.01 %and virtually no system8.tic error. The latter however,
requires further checking.
-6-
An interesting check on the U-factor for the high enriched feed to the
plant is obtained by plotting the V-factors as a function of enrichment,
as shown in Fig. 2. The theoretical U-factors for stoichiometric UF6
are given by the upper curve. The lower curve (dotted) is obtained by
joining the mean values of the U-factors for a given enrichment obtained
from the USAEC certificates. For a given enrichment a lower value than
stoichiometric indicates the presence of gaseous impurities.
4. Reference Campaign
The more important data for the reference campaign are presented in table 1.
In this section the main characteristics of the process scheme are analysed
with particular emphasis on the inventory situation. The important steps for
the multiple production scheme are shown ~n Fig. 3. Besides the feed and the
product storage, four other areas are to be discerned. They are, a) chemistry,
consisting of conversion and scrap recovery sections, the latter giving
rise to a final product (U02 powder), b) kernel production with THTR
coated particles as the final product, c) metallurgy, giving rise to three
final products, i.e. BR2 cermet pictures, SNEAK metal platelets and t~R
fuel elements, and finally, d) the assembly area for the RHF fuel element.
It is recalled that the RHF fuel element being fairly bulky (Fig. 8) and
containing 9.25 kgs of U of 93 %enrichment, cannot be measured for its U-
content ~n an integrated manner. The cermet pictures used for these elements
leaving the metallurgy area are therefore, measured y-spectrosccpically
(Fig. 1 stream 2.6) for their U-content, and no further U-measurements are
made for this stream.
Some typical v~ews of the ceramic and cermet pictures are shown in Figs. 5
and 6 respectively. A schematic diagram on the different steps for the
fabrication of a plate type MTR fuel element is r,iven in Fig. 7.
4. 1 Inventory of Nuclear Material
Fairly large amounts of nuclear material are required as inventory for the
operation of the various process streams. A number of reasons were given under
chapter 3 for the high amount of the inventory. Another characteristic of this
type of facility which increases the inventory is the heavy recycle rate. In
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some of the process steps this may be 2-3 times the production rate.
An analysis of the inventory situtation 1n the ma1n process steps indicates
that excepting for the materials 1n the chemistry section (conversion
and scrap recovery), inventories 1n all the other steps can be converted
into itemisable form with little or no difficulty. For example, the melt-
1ng ovens for Al-U alloy in the metallurgy section or the co-precipitation
and the homogenising units in the kernel production step, contain bulk
material which cannot be itemised or measured easily. However, all these
units operate in batches and the number of batches handled over a given
period of time is considerably larger than that handled in the converS10n
or the scrap recovery section for the same period of time. The finished
material coming out of these units can be brought into itemisable forms
or transferred into weighable or measurable containers. Therefore, if the
time for the physical inventory taking is so chosen that the conversion
and the scrap recovery sections are empty, the inventory material in the
rest of the plant can be itemised and tagged. Such an operating condition
can be purposely induced at least twice a year in the reference plant under
consideration. A typical inventory diagram over a S1X months period for a
number of relevant process units is shown in Fig. 4. At the end of this
period all the major units containing bulk material are emptied, transferred
into itemised forms and a physical inventory is taken.The amount and categories
of material which may be expected to be present during such an inventory is
shown in table 4. Several points require further elaboration:
a) Out of a total of 495 kgs of U, 425 kgs are present in the storage
and 70 kgs 1n the process area, during a physical inventory taking.
Therefore, by choosing the time of inventory properly, more than 85 %
of the nuclear material can be inventorised in the storage area alone.
This fact reduces significantly the difficulties normally associated with
inventory taking of large amounts of material in process areas for safe-
guards purposes.
b) The nuclear materials in the process area are all available in discrete,
weIl defined, itemised batches at a relatively small number of points.
c) All the categories of material are tagged with important batch data
and numberof measuring units. Since these units have been measured by
the operator (mostly at an earlier point of time) with the same accuracies
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as those obtained at the corresponding KMP's for throughput measurements
(table 2), the tag inventory taking will theoretically correspond to
these accuracies. (In practice, an inspection organisation can make
a full tag inventory with random sampling of a few measurement units
for direct measurement; if the measurement values correspond to the
tagged values within a certain preset confidence interval, the organisa-
tion can then accept all the values measured by the operator with the
corresponding measurement accuracies).
d) Although the total amount of inventory before and after the reference
campa~gn is the same, because of the high recycle rate, the different
categories in the process are renewed completely after the campaign.
Therefore, two inventories have to be taken. Only the sealed UF6
cylinders (category 4) need not be measured since the shippemdata re-
main unchanged during the operation.
e) The last category (heterogeneous scrap) poses a problem. Although the
containers with these materials may be kept sealed, no measurement
method exists at present to assay the uranium content in these materials.
The amounts of U ~n these materials become known only after they have
been treated in the scrap recovery section at a later date than that
at which the physical inventory has been taken Therefore,the balance
can be struck only after they have been measured. It appears highly
desirable to intensify efforts for the development of a suitable measure-
ment method for these materials.
5. Error Propagation in the Reference Campaign
The limits of error for the reference campa~gn have been calculated on the
basis of data given ~n tables 2 and 4. The results with the relevant input
data are summarized in table 5. Before an analysis of the results can be
attempted,some initial comments are required which pose limitations on
the interpretation of these results.
a) I given this table, are the resultingThe random errors 0R s,as ~n
values for a given stream after taking into consideration the actual
number of measurements (i.e. no. of batches, and analysis per batch
where appropriate). For this reason the 0R's for the stream 2.2 and
the inventory categories 1 and 3 are negligible compared to the
corresponding öS's. Similarly, the systematic errors ö
8
correspond
to the resulting values after taking into consideration (whenever
possible) the systematic errors in the different measurement steps for
a given stream.
b) The reported öR value of 0.4 %/3/ in table 2 (U-factor) and the re-
sulting value of 0.25 %for the KMP-1 has not been considered for
the error propagation calculations since more than an order of magnitude
lower value of öR is obtained from the data shown in table 2 (about
0.03 %instead of 0.4 %). The systematic error for the measurement of
U-factor, if any has also not been considered. In Ref. /3/ no values
for systematic error for this measurement has been given although in
other literatures (for example in the IAEA Working Paper to the present
Working Group) a fairly wide range of systematic errors can be found.
The weighing error for this KMP (0.01 %) has been considered to consist
of systematic errors only.
c) The LE calculations have been done for total uranium and not for U-235
s~nce a major part of the output streams is not assayed directly for
U-235 concentration. However, since the total uranium contains 90-93 %
U-235, the LE for U-235 will be about 7-10 %less than that for total
uranium, i.e. 0.82-0.85 kgs of U-235. These values will not be changed
much by taking into consideration the mass spectrometric measurement
errors.
d) The category 6 of inventory material ~n table 4 (heterogeneous scrap)
with 15 kgs, has not been considered for the LE calculations. It has
been assumed that at the time of balancing,the amount will be kept in
sealed form without direct measurement since no measurement methods are
available at present. After purification in the scrap recovery sections
sometimes later, the material becomes measurable with the accuracies of
the oxide stream (stream 2.1 table 2). This would mean an additional
LE contribution to the physical inventory taking of around 0.04 kgs U
by this category.
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With the above mentioned limitations as well as the process conditions 1n
view,a number of points are worth mentioning:
i) The LE for the total material balance is influenced significantly
by the errors in inventory taking (total LE of MB - 0.91 kgs U;
LE of inventory - 0.858 kgs U). This is mainly because of the large
LE for the category 1 material of the inventory (oS 0.3 %). compared
to the feed material (oS 0.01 %) for approximately the same amount
as also, because of the larger amount of inventory material compared
to the throughput (960 kgs inventory against 390 kgs throughput).
ii) In all the streams and categories,the systematic errors control the
LEiS. The weighted systematic error corresponding to the LE for
the throughput amounts to 0.08 %of the total throughput (2 times
195 kgs = 390 kgs U) or 0.16 %of the input. The corresponding value
of the systematic error for the inventory is 0.09 % (2 times 480 = 960 kgs
U ; 15 kgs are not measured). The total LE for the material balance
correspond to 0.47 %of the input or 0.91 kgs U. If the total amount
U be considered which has been measured during the balancing period,
it amounts to 1350 kgs U (390 kgs throughput, 960 kgs measured inventory).
The absolute value of the LE if expressed as a percentage of this total
amount, corresponds to 0.07 %which may also be considered to be a
systematic error, since all the sources of the LE are virtually from
systematic errors as mentioned earlier. These low values of systematic
errors reflect the care with which high enriched uranium 15 expected
to be handled under present day industrial conditions. However, some
of the measurement error values may require rechecking under interlabora-
torium test conditions.
iii) The ratio of the LEis for the inventory and the throughput amounts lS
approximately the same as that for the two amounts themselves (2.8 to
2.5). This indicates the predominance of the linearity in error pro-
pagation.
-11-
iv) An analysis of the LE I S for the different streams end categories
show that the main contributions come from category 1 (plates,
platelets, elements) of the inventory followed by feed (stream 1)
and oxide category (inventory, category 2) and finally by the
THTR particles (stream,2.5) and measured discards (stream, 3).
Importantpoint to note is the fact that the measured discards
being only 0.5 %of the input, contributes significantly to the
total LE, obviously because of the very high systematic error com-
ponent of the measurement (15 %). Still, the actual amount of 0.91 kgs
uranium is low compared to LEIs in other nuclear facilities with
equivalent arnounts of inventory and throughput.
6. Concluding Remarks
The ma1n purpose of the present paper lS to analyse the existing measurement
accuracies in a HEU fabrication plant which could be of relevance for
safeguards, and also to investigate their influences on the limits of
error for a material balance. The conclusions which can be drawn from this
analysis are of a preliminary nature and their validity are within the
limitations set forth in this paper'With this in view,following rernarks
are made.
6.1 The measurerner.t accuracies (both systematic end randorn) attainable
under industrial conditions in a HEU fabrication plant of the NUKEM
type for the feed and product stream are very high. So~e of them,
for example the rnass spectrornetric analysis and the Redox analysis
for the THTR particles may need checking on an interlaboratorium
scale to verify the given values. On the other hand, the very high
systernatic error of around 15 %expected in the y-spectrosopic measurernents
used for measured discards also requires a careful checking. High priority
R+D-work is needed for a nondestructive, and quick rneasurement method for
heterogeneous scraps available in itemised containers during a physical
inventory taking.
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6.2 Although the amount of inventory material in a HEU fabrication
plant may be high compared to the throughput (~ 500 kgs high enriched U
compared to 400-700 kgs throughput/yr), because of a high degree of
itemisation a tag inventory can be carried out relatively easily.
6.3 The limits of errorsfor a material balance are controlled almost ex-
clusively by the systematic errors of measurement for different streams
and categories and are influenced significantly by the LEIs of the
inventories. The absolute value of LEIs obtained for a material balance
period of six months for a fabrication plant of the N~1 type is in
the range of 1 kg U and well below those obtained in other nuclear
facilities with equivalent throughputs and inventories.
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Table 1 Throughput and Inventory Data for a Reference
Campaign in the HEU Fab. Plant.























































Table 2 11easurement Accuracies and Other Relevant Data for the KMP's for Feed (I),
Product (2) and Waste (3) Streams in the Ref. HEU Fab. Plant.
I. KMP I 2 3
category 2.1 2.2 2.3 I 2.4 2.5 2.6--
2. material UF6 Oxide
met. plat. (SNEAK) ce rm, p Lct , (BR2): MTR-elem. THTR-particles cerm. pict. (RHF) me as , discards
3. kgU/batch 15 10 5.1 0.025 i 0.277 1(+IOTh) 0.033 0.010
4. kgU/6 month 195 20 5.1 20 i 30.5 100 18.5 0.9
5. No. of batchs/6 month 13 2 I 800 I 110 100 560 90
6. meas. of total quant. weighing weighing weighing passiv-y
5) weighing passiv-y volume meas.v-me as ,
6.1 mean./batch I) 22,3 kg 11.5 5.1 22.5 gr U-235 250 gr U-235 11.76 kg 30 gr U-235 500 1
6.2 randpm error 0.01%2) RSD 0.1 % RSD 0.1 % RSD 0.4% RSD 0.3% o. I% RSD 0.4% RSD 5% RSD6.3 system. error 0.3% RSD not reported 0.3% RSD 3% RSD
-
7. U-factor 3) gravimetry stoichiometric redox titration y-meas.
7.1 mean./batch I) 0.6735 8) 88.0 w/o 8.5 w/o .:; 20 mg U/l
7.2 random error 0.4% RSD 0.2% RSD 0.1% RSD 15% RSD
7.3 system. error not considered 4) 0.2% RSD 0.1 1)RSD 15% RSD7.4 No. of samples/batch 0.2 a 400gr UF6 I 0.1 I7.5 No. of anal./samples not reported 2 2a 7000 particles I x Imin.
--
8. U-235 conc. mass. spec. mass. spec. 6) 6) 6) mass. spec. 6) 6)
8.1 mean./batch 90/93% 90/93% 90/93% 90% 90% 90% 93% 90/93%
8.2 r andom er ro r 0.05% (20)3) 0.05% RSD 0.05% RSD
8.3 system. error not reported 0.01% RSD 0.01% RSD
8.4 No. of samples/batch not reported I 0.1
8.5 No. of anal./sample not reported I I
I) per single measurement
2) scale precision ± 0.1 grams, weightsare reported to nearest gram by USAEC 111
3) see table IV and V of 111
4) composite sampie of max. 6 cylinder 111
5) reported in 121
6) based on previous measurements
7) sampling from homogenisation lot = 10 batches
8) reported in 131
Table 3 Recalibration data for 2 NBS-Standards ~n a Mass Spectrometer
in the HEU-Fab. Plant
NBS U-900
Date U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238 at %
31.7.1970 0.768 90. 195 0.341 8.696
31. 7.1970 0.772 90.188 0.343 8.698
30. 10.1970 0.769 90.190 0.337 8.705
18.6. 1971 0.762 90.196 0.337 8.705
7.10.1971 0.769 90.205 0.331 8.696
10.1.1972 0.764 90.173 0.338 8.725
25.2. 1972 0.756 90.203 0.338 8.694
23.3.1972 0.765 90.206 0.333 8.705
21. 7.1972 0.756 90.203 0.333 8.708
Mean 0.7646 90.1954 0.3368 8.7036
RSD % 0.746 0.0118 1. 157 0.109
NBS U-900 0.7779 90.1955 0.3329 8.6937
(1-Mean/NBS)% +1.71 0.00 -1.17 -0.11
NBS U-930
Date U-234 U-235 U-236 U-238
31.7.1970 1.077 93.336 0.210 5.377
31. 7.1970 1.080 93.328 0.208 5.384
24.3.1971 1.067 93.354 0.205 5.374
11. 5. 1971 1.067 93.351 0.208 5.374
18.6. 1971 1.073 93.337 0.207 5.383
25.2.1972 1.038 93.349 0.21 1 5.402
23.3.1972 1.064 93.355 0.204 5.377
21.7.1972 1.052 93.356 0.205 5.387
Mean 1.0648 93.3458 0.2073 5.3823
RSD % 1. 30 0.0113 1.20 0.17
NBS U-930 1.0806 93.3368 0.2027 5.3799
(1-Mean/NBS)% +1.46 -0.01 -2.27 -0.045
Reference data in the paper are refered to U-235.
TABLE 4 CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL DURING A PHYSICAL INVENTORY FOR THE REF.C*1PAIGN IN THE HEU FAB. PLANT








1. PICTURES, PLATELETS, 160 30 350/fIOO 0.4 0.3 Y-SPECTROSCOPY/
ELEMENTS DENSIlY
2. UF4' UAL3' ~ 00 20 20120 0.2 0.2 WEIGHING AND/OR
CHEM. -ANALYSIS
3. U-METAL REGULUS 50 - 10/10 - 0.1 11
4. UF6-cONTAINER (SEALED) 100 - NOT NECESSARY AS
SEALED
5. THTR-PARTICLES 20 20 40/40 0.1 0.1 WEIGHING AND
CHEM .ANALYSI S
6. ~ETEROGENEOUS, IMPURE SCRAPS 15 - - - - NOT MEASUREABLE
CRUCIBLES, SLAG, OXIDE DUST BEFORE RECOVERY
ETC.)
TOTAL LQS 70
TABLE 5 LIMITS OF ERROR (Lf) OF MATERIAL BALANCE <MB) FOR lHE REFERENCE CPMPAIGN IN lHE HEU-FAB.-PlANT
1. fq.1P 1 2 3 PHYSICAL INVENToR'l) (11+1 11)
STREAM!CATEGORY 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 1 2 3 5 6
2. TOTAL QUANTllY / KG u/ 195 20 5.1 20 30.5 100 18.5 0.9 19) 100 50 40 15
3. 0R %RSD (Q. 25> 1) 0.14 - 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 1.7 - 0.04 - 0.a2
4. Os %RSD 0.01 0.22 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.14 0.3 15. 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
5. TOTAL UNCERTAINlY
%OF 2. 0.01 0.26 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.14 0.3 15.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 -
KGU 0.195 0.050 0.005 0.060 0.092 0.14 0.056 0.136 0.570 0.200 0.050 0.040 -
3)
6. SUBTOTAL /KG U/ 0.306 V2 x 0.007 = 0.858
LIMITS OF ERROR (LE) OF TOTAL MB: 0.910 KG U
0.47 % OF INPUT
1)not considered because of' small range of' variation as shown in Fig. 2
2)see table 4
3)beginning and ending physical inventory considered here
4) resulting value after considering involved measurement
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FIG. 1 POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS
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Fig.2 U - fnctor vs U235 - enrichment for UFS
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Fig.4 Inventory diagram for process steps with bulk material
inventory over a 6 month period
Fig. 5: U-Al-platelet shaped parts (pietures)























Fis. 8: hel part of the high flux f'uel element (RHF) D I: 4 mm
